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Artikulu honetan “nazio” eta “estatu” tradiziozko kont zeptuek Europa modernoan izan duten 
esanahia aztertuko da, eta arraza edo hizkunt za baino legea eta historia faktore erabakigarriagoak 
izan direla ondorioztatuko da. Horregatik, autogobernatutako “commonwealth” edo errepublikaren, 
eta horren leialtasun zina jasot zen duen “estatuaren” arteko harremanean dat za “nazio-estatua” 
sort zeko gakoa. Esperient zia onenetan, “commonwealth” errepublikaren ideia jakin bat sustat zea 
eta eraikit zea lortu dute.
Gilt za-Hit zak: Nazioa. Estatua. Commonwealth. Absolutismoa. Pent salari politikoak. Valent zia.
Este artículo examina los conceptos tradicionales de «nación» y «estado» en la Europa 
moderna y trata sobre hasta que punto la ley y la historia han sido factores más determinantes 
que la raza o el idioma. Se considera que la clave del surgimiento de la «nación-estado» se 
encuentra en la relación entre la «commonwealth» (república) autogobernada y el «estado» al 
que jura lealtad. Las mejores experiencias logran promover y construir una determinada idea de 
«commonwealth».
Palabras Clave: Nación. Estado. Commonwealth. Absolutismo. Pensadores políticos. Valencia.
Cet article examine les concept s traditionnels de « Nation » et d’« État » dans l’Europe 
moderne, pour conclure que les lois et l’histoire ont été des facteurs bien plus déterminant s que 
la race ou que la langue. La clé de l’apparition de la « Nation-État » réside ainsi dans la relation 
entre la « Commonwealth » (République) autogouvernée et l’« État » auquel elle a juré loyauté. 
Les meilleures expériences permettent de promouvoir et de construire une certaine idée de la 
« Commonwealth ».
Mot s Clé : Nation. État. Commonwealth. Absolutisme. Penseurs politiques. Valence.
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The Oxford colloquium and its proceedings published here bring to mind 
once again the difference that has existed in the past between the culture of 
a people and its forms of political expression, or in other words between a 
‘nation’ and a ‘state’. One only has to look at a map of Europe around 1500 
to realise how politically fragmented the continent was at the time. Petty 
states like the Franche Comté, immortalised in the classic work of Lucien 
Febvre, kept their political autonomy, separated from neighbours with whom 
nevertheless they shared a common language and culture. This decentrali-
sation of power fostered the ‘vigorous talent for opposition and resistance’ 
–freedom in every sense of the word– which was to characterise Europe in the 
age of the Renaissance. What would have happened to Luther had there not 
been over 300 politically autonomous jurisdictions in the Holy Roman Empire, 
given that the Emperor was committed to the suppression of the rebellious 
preacher? Nor was it a coincidence that Burckhardt began his famous study 
of the Renaissance with a look at the ‘state as a work of art’ – an invitation to 
political competition and creativity, which thereby freed space for other kinds 
of innovation1. Meanwhile, at both ends of the continent, we find a division by 
clans and lordships and settlements, in a colonial setting where ethnic and 
family groupings took on great importance. One thinks of Ireland before the 
definitive English conquest in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, or of 
the vast steppe frontiers of the Russian, Polish and Ottoman rulers2.
Against these tendencies towards dispersal of authority there was an oppo-
site trend in the direction of agglomeration. The pioneering geographer Pedro 
de Medina had no hesitation in taking the whole of the Iberian peninsula as a 
unit of observation in 1548. He dedicated his treatise to the heir to the throne 
of Castile, the future Philip II, in order to give him an idea of the ‘grandeur’ of 
the land that he would be called upon to rule, even if this included Portugal, 
which was not yet part of the Spanish monarchy. ‘Spain has been divided in 
many ways’, Medina tells us, ‘but for this survey it will be broken down into ten 
kingdoms and seven provinces’. For him Andalusia was a ‘province’, Granada 
a ‘kingdom’, while ‘Lusitania’ was a province which included the ‘kingdom’ of 
Portugal. Reverence for classical Roman ‘provinces’ is here combined with a 
realistic sense of the frontier wars of more recent times. Iberia could be looked 
at from other perspectives, Medina goes on, following the ‘five main rivers’ 
and their tributaries, and taking into account the mountain barriers. But he is 
less interested in this geographical angle of vision than in the rich patrimony of 
historical memory associated with the places he sets out to map. The sense 
of the living past –the grandeur of monuments and men and events– triumphs 
over any ‘Braudelian’ interest in man and the natural world3.
1. FEBVRE, Lucien. Philippe II et la Franche Comté (1912), new edition, Paris: Flammarion 
1979; pp. 10-11.
2. FOSTER, R. F. The Oxford Illustrated History of Ireland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989. P. 93; MACNEILL, W. H. Europe’s Steppe Frontier 1500-1800, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press; 1964.
3. MEDINA, Pedro de. Libro de grandezas y cosas memorables de España (1548), In: A. 
González Palencia (ed.). Obras de Pedro de Medina, Madrid, 1944.
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We come across a similar perspective a century later, on the eve of the 
Scientific Revolution, in the well-known geography of the Peninsula by Rodrigo 
Méndez Silva. Here we are introduced to a series of regions, and of cities 
‘girt with stout walls’, each with its own heritage of memory and monument, 
language and customs. The Basques, he tells us, speak ‘the original tongue 
(or so they say), from Armenia and Chaldea, brought to Spain by Tubal’. In 
certain parts of the region they still wear ‘the dress of those times’. But the 
Basques were also seen as part of the wider Spanish community founded by 
Tubal. They were good with paper and ink, ‘occupying magistracies at court, 
posts of great responsibility’; and they were ‘very skilled navigators’ (had they 
not settled Ireland back in 250 A.D.?)4.
Patriotism, and not just in Spain, could operate at different levels, 
through a sense of loyalty to one’s local community, and above all to the 
memory of a past shared with others beyond that boundary. In his lament 
for the wars which were raging far and wide in his day, the poet Petrarch 
addressed himself to ‘Italia mia’, confident that his pain would be shared 
equally by the inhabitants of Rome and of the Po Valley as by his fellow 
citizens of Florence. It is of ‘Italy’ that the poet thinks when he grows tender 
at the memory of his birth and upbringing, of the place where his ancestors 
were interred. Born in 1304, Petrarch was, of course, an exile from his native 
Florence. May this have contributed to his sharpened awareness of a wider 
fatherland? Certainly, like Pedro de Medina and Rodrigo Méndez Silva, he 
took for granted the landscape which might confer a certain unity (or divi-
sion) on a people. In the case of Italy, ‘Nature looks after us well, placing the 
Alpine shield between us and the Germanic fury’5.
The Siete Partidas of Alfonso the Wise –in great part a philosophical 
treatise on the condition of man as well as a legal code– set out for a thir-
teenth-century Castilian public the foundations of human sociability.
One of the great bonds which a man may have with another is that of being 
born in the same place, for just as the flesh (natura) gives us our ties of family, 
so nature (naturaleza) makes us one by long custom of loving friendship (leal 
amor).
When two men from the same town ‘find themselves in another differ-
ent town, they take pleasure in each other’s company, and help each other 
out in whatever way they can’6. The local homeland, the patria chica, meant 
so much more to the men of an earlier age, where communication from one 
town to the next was so much slower than nowadays, where markets were 
essentially local – unless the itinerant merchants came with their wares 
at set times of the year on foot or on horseback. The whole trend over 
4. Población general de España, Madrid: 1645; p. 235v.
5. Canzionere, 128.
6. Las Siete Partidas del rey don Alfonso el Sabio, facsimile edition in 3 vols., Madrid, 1972; 
4/24, and 4/27/4.
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the modern period has indeed been to break this local autonomy, with the 
standardisation of coinage, weights and measures. If in the Madrid of the 
nineteenth century one could still tell the Valencians, Galicians or Aragonese 
immigrants by their clothes and trades, that world was to come to an end by 
19147. 
In his pioneering work of 1608 on the city of Granada, one of many 
municipal histories which were to follow suit in the years to come, Francisco 
Bermúdez de Pedraza headed one of his chapters with the title, ‘On the 
honour which comes from being born in a noble land’. For him, as for his 
near contemporary, the Valencian chronicler Gaspar Escolano in 1610, ‘the 
predominating stellar configuration’ greatly influenced the character and 
customs of the people. Related to the pattern of the stars was that of the 
climate: ‘men born in fresh and temperate lands, with a clear sky and soft 
breezes, are easy-going and soft-spoken, but sharp-witted and very insightful’. 
And Escolano goes on to praise the cosmopolitan nature of Valencia, given 
its links to the sea. Not to be outdone, Bermúdez de Pedraza pointed to the 
advantages of returning the sick to the land of their birth, here the very air 
itself seemed to revive their drooping spirit8.
To return to the fatherland at least at the end of one’s active life, and to 
leave one’s bones among those of the ancestors, were ambitions of many 
at this time. Half a world away from his homeland, the great explorer Vasco 
da Gama thought of Portugal as the place where he wished to end his days 
–at least in the opinion of the ne-er-do-well poet Camoens. In his epic poem 
of the overseas discoveries, Camoens sets out his view of ‘Spain’ and of 
Portugal’s place within it. Spain ‘grows large with different nations’. Bound 
together by the waters of the Ocean sea, these nations –‘all of such nobil-
ity and valour’– fight one another for supremacy. But the hand of destiny –or 
rather the conjunction of the zodiac– pushed forward the kings of Castile as 
the ‘restorers of Spain and lords thereof’. The Portuguese occupied such 
a small and infertile country that their bid for autonomy, consolidated with 
divinely-inspired victory over the Moors at Oruro in 1140, attracted relatively 
little opposition. By 1385 the sense of difference was so rooted in men’s 
minds that the failure of the ruling dynasty to produce an heir became a pop-
ular talking - point and no longer a vague historical memory. In Camoens’s 
famous line, the decision had then to be taken: ‘Who would renounce the 
faith, love, endeavour and style (arte) of being a Portuguese, and live to see 
his own kingdom made subject to another?’9.
7. Good insights are provided by BAREA, Arturo. La Forja de un Rebelde and MESONERO 
ROMANOS, Ramón. El Antiguo Madrid (1861), facsimile edition, Madrid: 1986. Also note here the 
observations of Unamuno on the decline of the small town with the coming of the railways, in his 
Andanzas y visiones españolas (Austral edition 1939).
8. Antigüedad y excelencias de Granada, Madrid, 1608; pp. 145v-148v.
9. Os Lusíadas (1573), new edition Porto Editora, Porto, n.d., canto IV.
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The question of how to recognise a ‘nation’ really only became acute in 
the latter part of the early modern period, as new ways of defining man’s 
relationship with God and his fellows came to be discussed. In the Americas 
the famous caste paintings, showing the various degrees of racial admixture 
to which special epithets were applied (coyote and zambo, as well as the 
more familiar mestizo or mulato) develop during the eighteenth century, at a 
time when racial inter-marriages or unions were increasing. Less than a racial 
element as such, the criterion of social status in this New World remained 
the traditional one of ‘reason’. Were such and such a people ‘men of reason’ 
(gente de razón)? Would they fit into a society based on paperwork, histori-
cal memory, respect for a society wider than the clan? Not to belong to the 
world of rational discourse could be observed in the way people dressed 
(with the lowest not wearing clothes at all), the houses they lived in, the way 
they farmed the land and took thought to save money for the morrow. One 
of the bases of the colonial idea, developed already during the Middle Ages 
and applied in Ireland and Poland before being exported to the Americas, 
was that land was being wasted by the native inhabitants, who, for their own 
good, should be brought under some kind of external authority and learn from 
outsiders who were to be settled among them10.
While we today are likely to pay more attention to language and ethnic-
ity as the mark of a nation, the early modern world was more attuned to 
arguments drawn from law (including religion) and history. It was the fueros 
(liberties in the general sense, applied to individuals and corporations) which 
regulated a society and conferred on it rights of self-government. The ‘com-
monwealth’ (república) was this amalgamation of ‘private’ law (privilege), 
which provided a framework or constitution for its activities. The system 
was essentially self-running, and when adjustments were neeed, they were 
effected in negotiation with the Prince, who represnted the estado, which was 
conceived of as essentially the reserve powers of a monarch. European kings 
claimed to be placed on their thrones by God, but their margin for manoeuvre 
was actually rather small, since the Church upheld the notion of ‘sovereignty’ 
as residing with God, not with the king. This could be a recipe for rebellion, 
and it was not perhaps until the classical order imposed by the monarchy of 
Louis XIV (1643-1715), effectively excluding the Church from the direction of 
political affairs, that it made sense to say, as Louis is alleged to have done: 
‘L’état, c’est moi’. 
The Valencian jurist Tomás Cerdán de Tallada, devoted the first chapter 
of his important thesis of 1604 to the question: ‘What kind of thing is a 
state?’. He renounced the attempt to define a ‘commonwealth’, but assumed 
that these organic entities had grown up over the years, incorporating (as in 
the case of the kingdom of Valencia, for example) several different climatic 
zones and two or three linguistic groupings (Arabic, Catalan, Aragonese). As 
10. BARTLETT, Robert. The Making of Europe: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-
1350, London: Penguin Books, 1994; pp. 202-3 and pp. 238-9. Cf. ELLIOTT, J. H. Empires of the 
Atlantic World; Britain and Spain in America 1492-1830, Yale University Press, 2006.
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these organic communities came to be grouped together under a dynastic 
ruler, ‘they began to form a state’. A good example of this process was to be 
found in the Spanish monarchy itself, which 
by means of marriages and inheritance and legal anomalies, and through acquired 
rights, wars and conquests, which the Holy See allowed the kings of Spain to 
undertake for good causes…has incorporated in the person of our lord and king 
such a variety of kingdoms, provinces, lordships and urban commonwealths11.
The power of the king was to be like that of a husband over his wife. 
‘Between the king and the commonwealth’, Cerdán tells us, ‘a moral and 
political marriage is arranged, and this is why the king is obliged to keep 
the laws which in the Cortes (parliament), by common consent of the ruler 
and his people, he has conceded to his vassals’. One hears the voice of a 
Valencian nobleman behind the rhetoric, anxious to safeguard the customs 
of his native land. But Cerdán was also a graduate in Roman law and a mag-
istrate serving the crown in the royal supreme court (Audiencia) of Valencia, 
and he agreed that the ruler must have absolute power (poder absoluto) of 
setting aside the letter of the law in emergencies. Also, there needed to be 
some coordination of policy among the various kingdoms, so the monarch 
must assemble a Council of State in Madrid, representative of the various 
regions, so that he knew about local conditions, and so that people could 
see his desire to take them all into his confidence12.
The monarchy must, therefore, aim for a certain rationalisation and cen-
tralisation of authority. But just as Pilate sent Christ back to be judged by the 
Jewish authorities, so the last word should be left to local representatives. 
‘Outsiders don’t know the customs and quality of the land and its inhabit-
ants…and they cannot know much about its inner workings’. And he went on: 
‘If they do not have a good grasp of the nuances of a language (idioma de la 
lengua), and the exact meaning of words and how people use them in speak-
ing, how can they resolve what needs doing?’. Outside magistrates are liable 
to turn into tyrants, since they lack reverence (pietas) for the old ways. And, 
in an interesting aside, he doubted whether native sons would be any more 
corrupt, favouring their friends, than outsiders, who would acquire their own 
clique of sycophants all too quickly13. 
The counsels of Cerdán de Tallada echo those of another great Valencian 
thinker, Fadrique Furió Ceriol. Furió left home when he was about twenty 
years old, in 1549. With less of a grasp on the Spanish situation than 
Cerdán, he was by contrast more cosmopolitan, more European, given his 
long experience of the religious and political conflicts in the Netherlands. 
For him the Spanish Monarchy was a European institution, and its ministers 
must be ‘not only Castilians or Aragonese, but also Sicilians, Neapolitans, 
11. Veriloquium en reglas de estado, Valencia, 1604; p. 2.
12. Ibíd.; p. 59.
13. Ibíd.; pp. 42-44.
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Milanese and Burgundians’. Each province was welcome to keep its own laws 
and government, but there must be coordination in several spheres. First 
of all, in finance; then in what Furió called ‘el mantenimiento’ and which we 
might translate as ‘economic policy’ (involving the need to ‘conciliate those 
countries whose trade we cannot do without’). Then came the administration 
of justice (which would require a hard look at local customs to see if they 
were more a cause than a remedy of litigation), and the delicate business 
of knowing whom to promote to office and honour14. The list of seven areas 
of responsibility for the monarch reminds us of the potentially vast power of 
the ‘state’, if it chose to exercise it. But the danger here was the resistance 
liable to be put up by the ‘república’ or commonwealth, with its own very clear 
idea of the limitations on royal power.
Creating a state would not be easy. Furió was aware of the need to 
respect the differing traditions of the component provinces. Above all, the 
king must consult representatives from each of the provinces. Otherwise, he 
tells us,
the people grow resentful at seeing themselves kept out of the centre of govern-
ment and power, seeing none of their own appointed to the Council; from which 
they conclude (not without reason) that the Prince holds them to be of little 
account.
And he emphasised:
we all have a keener insight into the customs, temperament, ambitions, good 
points and bad, family backgrounds… abuses and advantages of the country 
where we were born and brought up than of other places15.
So, how did the process of defining what was and what was not included 
in a ‘Spanish’ monarchy, and what the relationship would be between the 
component parts of that ‘state’, actually take place? The philosopher José 
Ortega y Gasset, in a famous essay of 1921, whose title we might translate 
as ‘Spain without a backbone’, made the point that nations do not necessar-
ily become states by some organic evolution over time. Rather, states were 
the fruit of aggression, of the incorporation by moral and sometimes physical 
force of small units caught up in a whirlwind of expansion led by their big-
ger neighbours. At certain stages in history, certain political entities had the 
capacity for moral and political leadership, which dragged others into their 
wake in a common programme of expansion. Castile had this capacity in the 
days of the Empire and of the Counter Reformation; but now in the twentieth 
century she seemed to have lost that creative, impulsive quality which had 
stood her in such good stead in the past. Castile made the country known as 
14. Concejo y consejeros del Príncipe (1559), ed. Adolfo de Castro, Biblioteca de Autores Es-
pañoles, vol. 136, Madrid, 1855; pp. 321-3; MÉCHOULAN, Henri. Raison et altérité chez Fadrique 
Furió Ceriol, Paris: Mouton, 1973.
15. Ibíd.; p. 334.
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Spain; but by her weakness, culturally, economically, politically, she seemed 
no longer to have anything to offer to the regions of the Iberian peninsula 
which were less inclined to accept an artificial Castilian hegemony16.
Ortega’s idea can be traced in the lengthy prologue to the monumen-
tal history of Spain edited by Ramón Menéndez Pidal from 1947 onwards. 
Here the Spaniards were portrayed as both a nation and a state, but a 
nation which kept on denying its own existence. He quoted the French sev-
enteenth-century traveller Bartolomé Joly to register the surprising degree 
of rivalry among the regions: ‘their usual entertainment is to find something 
bad to say about one another’17. There was something of this in the letter 
which Estefania de Requesens wrote to her mother about their beloved child 
and grandchild, ‘Lluiset’, the future don Luis de Requesens, entrusted by 
Philip II in the 1570s with the forlorn assignment of bringing peace to The 
Netherlands. As a page at court in 1534, he had ample opportunity to expe-
rience the searing effects of national prejudice. ‘He says…that he wants 
to be Catalan’, reported his mother, married to a great Castilian noble of 
the Zúñiga family, ‘for he defends the country against the other pages of 
Prince Philip, who speak ill of Catalonia’18. When he came to make his will 
in September 1573, the old loyalties of childhood still shone through, as he 
provided that a third of the places in his new educational foundation in the 
University of Alcalá should be reserved for Catalans19. 
For Menéndez Pidal there was a certain contradiction in the meaning of 
the word ‘Spaniard’. The traveller in Latin America, he tells us, will be sur-
prised to find associations called ‘Galician’, ‘Asturian’ or ‘Catalan’, and will 
come away with the impression that a Spanish identity hardly exists. But 
it would be more correct to say that a ‘Spanish’ culture runs through all of 
them. True, the patria chica has played a great role in Spanish history, but 
it lacks many of the structural features we might expect of nationhood. In 
the first place, geographical determinism can be ruled out. As Menéndez 
Pidal points out, the cultural divisions of the Peninsula do not correspond 
to barriers erected by the hand of nature: they do not respect the line of the 
mountains or the rivers. The fragmentation of political authority during the 
Middle Ages, which created the autonomous kingdoms of Castile, Navarre, 
Aragon, did not stem from or correspond to cultural influences, since all 
these realms were –with the exception of Portugal– ‘bilingual’. Though each 
pursued its own strategy of aggrandisement, they all invoked the sacred 
memory of ‘Spain’ at one time or another in the wars of reconquest against 
16. España Invertebrada, Madrid, 1921.
17. MENÉNDEZ PIDAL, Ramón. Los Españoles en la Historia, 2nd edition, 1971, Madrid: Es-
pasa Calpe; p. 113.
18. SIMON i TARRÉS, Antoni. Construccions politiquesi i identitats nacionals: Catalunya i els 
origen de l’estat modern espanyol, Barcelona: 2005, Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat, 2005; 
p. 243.
19. MATILLA TASCÓN, A. (ed.), Testamentos de 43 personajes del Madrid de los Austrias, Ma-
drid: Instituto de Estudios Madrileños, 1983; p. 25.
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the Moor. This common allegiance was underpinned by cultural borrowings, 
with themes from the Castilian ballads about the Cid and other heroes taken 
up and reworked by Catalan-language poets20.
For Menéndez Pidal, the various peoples of the Peninsula became 
‘Spanish’ by a certain historical process which drew on elements they held 
in common. The process was not uniform nor irreversible, but depended on 
the vagaries of history. Rather than pleading for an innate ‘Spanish’ identity, 
Menéndez Pidal regarded this as something which had to be worked out over 
time. Much like Ortega, he thought Castile was at the heart of the movement. 
In this he differed from another great historian, his junior in years but in 
some senses the founder of the modern historiographical tradition in Spain: 
Jaume Vicens Vives (1910-60). Vicens was a Catalan, living through one of 
the most fraught periods of Spanish history: the Civil War of 1936-9 and 
then the subsequent Franco regime, which looked askance at anything which 
might foster Catalan separatism. In 1954 Vicens published his seminal work 
on the evolution of Catalonia, setting out his controversial view that Catalonia 
was a nation defined less by character and temperament than by historical 
process. It made no sense to read Catalan history backwards – to invest the 
medieval struggles of towns and nobility against the crown with the romantic 
air of nineteenth-century individualism and liberal principles.
Need we remind ourselves that the Catalans of the Middle Ages were neither 
liberals nor democrats…? They were men of their time, who resolved their prob-
lems in accord with a strictly medieval outlook based on the idea of privilege and 
privileged classes’21.
The famous revolt of 1640, breaking out at the same time as that which 
was to give Portugal her independence and traditionally seen as a defence 
of Catalan identity was now reinterpreted by Vicens in accordance with the 
‘facts’ of what actually happened: a peasant uprising against the billeting 
of troops, which dragged the elite in its wake into a confrontation with the 
Monarchy. Similarly, the tragic events of 11 September 1714, when Bourbon 
troops stormed into rebel Barcelona, could be seen less as a manifestation 
of Castilian or Spanish oppression than as a confused civil war in which the 
nobility had already abandoned the popular cause. The subsequent rise of a 
more centralised Spanish government and economy was something of which 
the Catalan nobility and businessmen took full advantage22.
Contrary to the perspective of Ortega y Gasset, Vicens saw the history 
of Spain not so much as the expansion of Castile and more the adjustment 
of relationships over time between neighbours. The question was not one of 
20. Los Españoles en la historia; p. 151
21. Noticia de Catalunya (1954), new edition, Barcelona: Ediciones Destino, 1962; p. 108.
22. Noticia de Catalunya; p. 203. Cf. ARRIETA, Jon. ‘Conversaciones con Ernest Lluch acerca 
del austracismo’, In: Eliseo Serrano (ed.), Felipe V y su tiempo, Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el 
Católico, 2004; pp. 235-256.
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nationalism in the abstract, but of the hammering out of political solutions to 
specific challenges. And the first and greatest of these challenges was the 
growing power of the modern state – the ‘leviathan’ of which Thomas Hobbes 
wrote in the seventeenth century, and which Vicens re-baptised as the mino-
taur (truly a more sinister beast, not always perceptible to those making their 
way through the labyrinth of day-to-day politics).
The menace took shape in the so-called ‘military revolution’ of the early 
modern period. The increased costs of warfare required a reformulation of the 
traditional relationship between the ‘state’ and the ‘commonwealth’. According 
to the political philosophy of the time the república owed the king assistance 
with his needs, but on a clearly limited and defined contractual basis, ham-
mered out in parliamentary debate. What was becoming evident by the reign 
of Philip IV (1621-65) was that this formula was no longer working, that (as 
Olivares, the chief minister, pointed out in his great memorial of 1625) it was 
easier to negotiate a military alliance with a foreign country than to get troops 
from one’s own people. The problem was both that there were too many 
fragmented commonwealths or kingdoms or provinces to deal with within the 
Spanish monarchy, but also that too many of these were well-protected by their 
traditional fueros and privileges against royal exactions. The so-called ‘Union 
of Arms’ which Olivares proposed in 1625 was meant to establish once and 
for all that the subject had a duty to contribute to the defence of the monarchy 
as a whole. Indeed since 1575 the argument for increasing taxes in Castile 
had been that the conditions of war had changed, that the ‘kingdom’ owed 
an obligation to vote the required taxes since these were being employed for 
the defence of the kingdom’s trade and shipping, not for the benefit of the 
Prince. There was clearly some justification for this changing emphasis since, 
effectively, the state was now taking more of a hand in the regulation of the 
economy in this new ‘age of mercantilism’. As the Count of Gondomar put it in 
one of his letters from his London embassy to Philip III, warfare was no longer 
a matter of valour but of money23. Anyway, the ‘leviathan’ that was the seven-
teenth-century state was usurping many responsibilities of local communities, 
pursuing vagabondage and ‘idleness’ on an increasing scale. 
For Olivares military cooperation between the various parts of Spain 
would require an effort to overcome ‘the dryness and coldness of feeling’ 
which characterised their relations. This would involve, among other things, 
encouraging the nobility to seek service and promotion outside their native 
kingdoms. Instead of being count of Barcelona, king of Valencia, lord of 
Vizcaya, Philip IV must aim to become nothing less than ‘king of Spain’, 
father of all his vassals equally. But instead of proving an inducement to 
accept the Union of Arms, this ‘union of hearts’ was commonly perceived as 
a threat to do away with local privileges. The fear throughout the Crown of 
Aragon in 1640, commented the Viceroy of Valencia, don Fernando de Borja, 
was that ‘Your Majesty will have no other laws but those of Castile’. The 
Council of Aragon might dismiss these fears, ‘since they are so far from the 
23. Cartas del conde de Gondomar.
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truth and with no foundation whatever’, but clearly the path to the creation of 
a Spanish ‘nation’ was going to be a difficult one24. 
The problem was in part one of cultural differences, visible in a very different 
concept of politics and of the rights of the individual. When Philip II sent an army 
into Aragon in 1591 to seize Antonio Pérez as a criminal of state, he brushed 
aside the legal trammels on such action. With due caution yet with firmness, 
the Aragonese chronicler Lupercio Leonardo de Argensola censored the royal 
action. ‘Some nations’, he wrote (and his readers could see that he had Castile 
in mind), ‘place such a high price on correction that they give the judge a free 
hand so that nothing is left unpunished… They put their faith in the execution-
er’s axe, the gallows, shackles, stocks and chains’. But other nations ‘hold all 
these things in horror. They fear the abuse of power, and like Aristotle hold that 
men without the restraint of law are like wild beasts. So they prefer that many 
guilty persons go free rather than that an innocent suffer’. And with his native 
Aragon in mind, he spoke of the tradition of ‘tying the hands of the magistrate 
so that he does no wrong, in the same way as we tie those of the accused for 
the wrong he did’. The laws of Aragon were designed to ‘limit the power of men, 
to encourage gentleness and reform, and so they are called fueros, liberties, 
observances, practices and customs of the Kingdom of Aragon’. They gave 
Aragon its political identity and required to be administered by native sons25.
Machiavelli had written that it was easier to integrate different provinces 
within a monarchy when their customs were much the same, and he cited 
the successful absorption of Brittany and Normandy by the Kings of France. 
By contrast, one of the most significant barriers to union in the early modern 
period was differences of cultures, and particularly of religion. The magis-
trate and writer Mateo López Bravo paid particular attention to this point in 
his treatise of 1616, expanded later under Olivares. López Bravo was clear 
enough in his own mind that national identities of this sort were fundamen-
tally artificial creations. Mankind was a natural community, ‘divided by laws 
which stem from ambition and avarice, for really the only difference between 
one man and another is a matter of individual vice and virtue’26. This idea 
echoed that advanced half a century earlier by Fadrique Furió Ceriol:
There are only two countries in the world: the land of the good and that of 
the bad. All good people, whether they are Jews, Moors, Gentiles, Christians or of 
some other sect, come from the same country, the same family and household, 
and the same applies to bad people27.
24. Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, Consejo de Aragón, leg. 658, don Fernando de Borja al 
rey, y consulta, 14 de agosto 1640.
25. Información de los sucesos del reino de Aragón en los años de 1590 y 1591, written in 
1604, edited by Xavier Gil Pujol, Zaragoza, 1991: pp. 66-71
26. Del Rey y de la raçón de governar, ed. Henri Méchoulan, Madrid: Editora Nacional, 1977; 
pp. 205-206.
27. Del Concejo y de los consejeros del Príncipe; p. 329.
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Religious fanaticism, however, was capable of throwing up barriers 
between peoples. According to López Bravo, ‘men who dream up new ways 
of understanding or worshipping God fill the fickle minds of the people with 
sedition’. Such rabble-rousers were generally ‘men of no account’, who 
preached new ways ‘either to put food in their stomachs, or to win a reputa-
tion for themselves, or to win the sweets of power’. The long wars in Flanders 
seemed to illustrate the danger of mixing religion and politics, but also the 
impossibility of separating the two given the ambition of men. It was in the 
interest of the monarch, therefore, to maintain ritual and festivals, even if 
these seemed childish, in order to establish a cultural bridgehead between 
himself and his subjects.
This raises the important question of the integration of outlying provinces 
into a multi-national state through the medium of culture. It had been one 
of the strengths of the Inca empire that the sons of the chiefs of conquered 
tribes were sent to the imperial capital, Cuzco, in order to learn the language 
and ways of their new masters. Reflecting in 1570 on the disturbances in The 
Netherlands, the humanist Benito Arias Montano gave his opinion that
after the matter of religion there is nothing which so joins the mind of men of 
different nations in friendship and sociability, and so disposes them to a quiet 
acceptance and imitation of the customs of their rulers than unity and conformity 
of language28.
We can see the process at work in Spain, as Castilian became the stand-
ard ‘Spanish’ tongue, carried by the printing press (though Latin at first was 
more the beneficiary of this new means of rapid communication), but above 
all by the triumphs of Castilian-language accounts of the New Worlds beyond 
Europe, by the magnificent spiritual and imaginative literature of the Golden 
Age. The diary kept by the Valencian noble Bernardo Catalá de Valeriola 
(1568-c.1607) gives an interesting insight into the role of the court and of 
the ambition for imperial office in weaning provincial elites gradually and 
un-self-consciously away from the use of their native tongue as they mixed 
more with their fellow-elites from other parts of the monarchy29. Conquered 
territories might find the pace of integration accelerated. The Intendant of 
Roussillon, taken by the French crown in 1659, reported to Paris in 1672 the 
advantages of encouraging the use of French rather than the local Catalan 
tongue30. Schools were set up where the children learned to read and write 
in French, and eventually French became compulsory for the drawing up of 
notarial documents and parish records. More drastic seems to have been the 
28. Quoted in SIMON i TARRÉS, Antoni. Construccions politiques; p. 193.
29. Autobiografía y Justas poéticas, ed. por Salvador Carreres Zacarés. Valencia: Acción Bi-
bliográfi ca 1929. Cf. SANCHIS GUARNER, Manuel. Els Valencians i la llengua autòctona durant els 
segles XVI, XVII i XVIII, Valencia: Editorial de la Universidad, 2001, and FUSTER, Joan. La Decadèn-
cia al País Valencià, Barcelona: Curial, 1976.
30. SHALINS, Peter. Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1989; p. 118.
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prohibition on the public use of Catalan or Valencian in the territories of the 
Crown of Aragon after these were forcibly brought to acknowledge the author-
ity of the Castilian king, Philip V, in the civil war known as the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1702-1714).
It would seem that the new age of absolutism had little time for provincial 
idiosyncrasies. The model of the monarchy of Louis XIV appeared to set the 
tone for Europe: the magnificence of the court at Versailles, but above all the 
rational exploitation of the resources of a federal kingdom by a bureaucracy 
and a massive, well-disciplined army. The question of how ‘rational’ or ‘cen-
tralised’ this regime –and others like it– really was has exercised the minds 
of historians since Alexis de Tocqueville in 1856. For de Tocqueville, of 
course, the regime had become very centralised indeed and the Revolution of 
1789 merely completed the process. But the question arises as to the nature 
of the chain of communication and obedience between centre and periphery 
as the provinces lost their autonomy. The forging of the absolutist monarchy 
in France took place in the seventeenth century amid a welter of regional 
uprisings which have been variously interpreted as class conflicts (protests of 
the peasantry against high taxes) and ‘regionalist’ movements which bonded 
lord and peasant together against interference from Paris31. What seems rea-
sonably clear is that ultimately the ancien régime came to depend on a tacit 
accord between the ruling families at the local level and the apparatus of 
state to share the fruits of power and honour. The court culture of Versailles 
broke down the barriers between the crown and the regions – though it aggra-
vated the problem of finding acceptable intermediaries between the two as 
the great families gradually lost their provincial roots and culture. The call for 
democracy –in the sense of representative government– in 1789 was in large 
part a response to this phenomenon32.
The situation in France was perhaps extreme. More often the states of 
Europe still resembled the ramshackle structure inherited from the Middle 
Ages. In the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, despite the religious and political 
upheavals of the seventeenth century, the old provincial divisions persisted 
as living entities – not quite nations (by a modern definition, at least), not 
quite states, but a mixture of both. The nearest analogy would be to think of 
them as the republics or commonwealths of old, which had preceded the con-
cept of state power. The noble families kept alive a historical memory, though 
they might have little real tradition in the area. One thinks of the Czech lords, 
imposed on the kingdom of Bohemia by the Habsburgs after their victory 
at the White Mountain in 1620. Despite the fostering of German as a co-
31. The old controversy between the Marxist interpretation of PORCHNEV, Boris. Les soulève-
ments populaires en France au XVIIe siècle, Paris: SEVPEN, 1963, and the ‘regionalist’ emphasis 
of MOUSNIER, Roland. Fureurs paysannes: les paysans dans les révoltes du XVIIe siècle: France, 
Russie, Chine, Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1967, is far from settled.
32. For the social foundations of the seventeenth-century state, BEIK, William. Absolutism and 
Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. I have relied heavily on de Tocqueville, L’Ancien Régime 
et la Révolution, for my interpretation of the eighteenth-century development.
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official language and the influx of adventurers from many parts of Europe to 
take over land and power from the ancient Czech families who had rebelled 
against the monarchy, the parliamentary assemblies or estates of the realm 
quickly re-established the concept of an ancient kingdom of Bohemia, with 
pride in the old legends, language and traditions. Emperors Ferdinand III and 
Leopold I were happy to listen to sermons preached to them in Czech and 
even to make the occasional attempt at saying a few words in that language.
The desire for continuity with the medieval past gave the Kingdom of 
Bohemia, now purged of its Protestant tendencies, its notably hybrid char-
acter of a ‘loyal’ but ‘autonomous’ province within the Habsburg Monarchy 
– a legacy which would be transmitted to later generations as the framework 
of a fully-fledged ‘nation state’. Hungary provided yet another illustration of 
this familiar theme. Here the ruling elite was more distant from the Habsburg 
court, both physically and in terms of religion and language. The successive 
revolts of the Magyars against Vienna during the seventeenth century even-
tually played themselves out in the Peace of Szatmár (1711), which gave 
Hungary effective political autonomy. The compromise between Habsburg 
‘absolutism’ and Hungarian liberties worked essentially through those social 
pressures which were creating an elite of great aristocratic families, like the 
Esterhazy, whose closeness to the Viennese court, to the Catholic faith and 
to their own clients and retainers helped soothe the restless spirit of the 
Magyar gentry33. 
Here and in other parts of Europe the recent emphasis of the historio-
graphy of state formation has been on the gradual emergence of ‘absolute 
monarchy’ as a social and cultural compromise between local elites and the 
crown. If we were to compare the French and Austro-Hungarian experiences, 
the thing which strikes one is the greater degree of integration of the prov-
inces of France, and this at a socio-economic level. It was not really until the 
nineteenth century that the Danube became the great highway linking the 
various parts of the Habsburg Monarchy. Before then it was relatively inac-
cessible to the landed proprietors, who preferred to live by the labour of their 
serfs rather than the marketing of their grain or cattle. Hence, the failure of 
the attempts of Joseph II to abolish serfdom there in the 1780s. The creation 
of the integrated ‘nation state’ seemed to depend not only on a flourishing 
court culture but also on a certain degree of market capitalism. 
This impression is driven home by considering the English experience, 
where one of the strongest states in Europe began to emerge, drawing admit-
tedly on its Norman and Angevin administrative roots, but clearly becoming 
by the end of the seventeenth century a formidably well-coordinated polity. In 
formal terms there was great devolution of power, even after the accession 
of James I in 1603 brought together the three kingdoms of England, Scotland 
and Ireland. And we are reminded of the relative absence of a full-time 
33. EVANS, R.J.W. The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550-1700, Oxford: University 
Press, 1979; pp. 214-5 and 257-61.
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bureaucracy, as the gentry took responsibility for most matters of administra-
tion and petty justice at the level of the county. The world of these ‘Justices 
of the Peace’ was that of their region, and they regarded askance attempts to 
impose greater uniformity from London in matters of religion or social welfare. 
The challenge facing England was much the same as that on the continent: 
the advent of the ‘leviathan’, the fiscal state, created by the military revolu-
tion (though the Scots and the Irish offered only a feeble challenge to ancient 
ways of fighting wars). The question of taxation was bound up with that of a 
lack of confidence between the Stuart kings and their parliaments (largely 
representative of the gentry) over such matters as religion and foreign policy. 
Disputes over the intervention of the central government in the counties esca-
lated in the familiar way. The Civil War of 1642-9 was a complex movement, 
envenomed by deep religious convictions (Puritan England, Calvinist Scotland, 
Catholic Ireland). Despite the support of Charles I for a traditional Christian 
commonwealth which would limit enclosures of common land and exploita-
tion of the poor, he notably failed to wean the majority of the common people 
away from support for their parliamentary leaders. Though the war was not a 
bourgeois revolution, it did mark a critical turning-point in the English concept 
of the state, the commonwealth and the economy. The decisive, long-term 
failure of a strong monarchy left all real power in the hands of a gentry, freed 
from interference by government and free to refuse taxes except on its own 
terms34.
The loose-limbed English state became an inviting partner for others to 
join. In 1707 the Scottish parliament legislated itself out of existence, placing 
the country fully under the rule of London. The motive appears to have been a 
desire to take advantage of the economic protection which this new ‘British’ 
state could provide. Though the ‘United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland’ 
would have to wait for another century, when in 1800 the Irish parliament 
also legislated for its own abolition and incorporation into the Westminster 
parliament, the integration of the British state was already beginning to look 
like a formidable achievement. The contrast with Spain in that very same year 
of 1707, which saw the invasion of the kingdoms of Valencia and Aragon 
by Castilian armies and the abolition of the separate laws and privileges of 
these territories, highlighted a stark difference between a state like England 
which drew itself together by ‘attraction’ and one like Spain which had to act 
against centrifugal tendencies. But why the contrast?
It would appear that the British state could count on a greater degree of 
confidence and trust between rulers and ruled, between centre and periph-
ery. The study of one community may help shed light on a wider process. 
The focus of the study in question is the county of Durham - remote, poor, 
dominated until the middle of the sixteenth century by the old feudal dynas-
ties like the Percy from castles which faced north to the Scottish frontier. It 
was typical Catholic country, until the ‘Revolt of the North’ in 1569 on behalf 
34. Very stimulating and thought-provoking here is BRADDICK, Michael J. State Formation in 
Early Modern England 1550-1700, Cambridge: University Press, 2000.
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of the old faith compelled Elizabeth I to get rid of her over-mighty and rebel-
lious lieutenants, these feudal magnates like the Percy. Emerging from under 
their shadow there grew up a new ‘middle class’ of entrepreneurs, capable 
of exploiting the rich coal deposits of the area, which increasingly were in 
demand in London. Serving this new-found commercial class and helping to 
run government locally there developed an educated local elite, a product of 
the boom in schooling in the region. Comparing Durham at the outbreak of 
the Civil War with the region as it emerged from the Middle Ages, the author 
is clear about the multiplication of opportunities for the individual, of avenues 
of access between the local and the wider world35. It was the end, effectively, 
of the reign of the caciques, the local chieftains who had monopolised these 
avenues of power in the past. It was this gradual coming together of local 
communities at quite a basic level of work and travel which underlies the 
strength of the new sense of a British identity noted by other authors around 
this time. Festivals celebrating the Protestant Isle and its safe delivery from 
overseas menace in 1588 or 1605, and the flag-waving by ‘Britons’ in the 
eighteenth century, all suggest a ‘fatherland’ very different from medieval 
times36.
It was not a world immediately recognisable to a Spaniard of the time. In 
his great work on the court city of Madrid (1623), the chronicler Gil González 
Dávila sketched the features of a cosmopolitan world capital. He commented 
on ‘the variety of nations which flock to this court, which feel at home here 
and look upon it as a substitute for their own place of origin since they can 
find here in equal measure health, pleasure, lively spirits, even tempers, hon-
our and opportunity’. The influence of the city reached out to distant shores: 
Madrid was ‘the very fount of a Christian commonwealth, the guide to how 
people ought to behave, the seat of prudence and wisdom’. The court did not 
admit ‘excess or waste, but rather lived with admirable restraint, using its vir-
tue and modesty to teach the other cities of the empire the means required 
to make a success of this life’37.
No doubt Madrid was beginning to develop into a real capital around 
this time, and particularly in the years after 1623 as Olivares and Philip IV 
strained every nerve to promote the arts as a form of political propaganda. 
Yet the writings of the period would suggest the continued importance of 
other centres of cultural activity: the monasteries, the vice-regal courts of 
Valencia or Naples, the aristocratic confraternities like that of Seville which 
offered spiritual direction to the local elites and served as a focus of artistic 
patronage. Of course, the populations were caught up from time to time in 
celebrations of royal births or military triumphs, but the calendar of festival 
35. JAMES, Mervyn. Family, Lineage and Civil Society: A Study of Society, Politics and Mentality 
in the Durham Region 1500-1640, Cambridge: University Press, 1974.
36. CRESSY, David. Bonfi res and Bells: National Memory and the Protestant Calendar in Eliza-
bethan and Stuart England, London: Weidenfeld, 1989; COLLEY, Linda. Britons: Forging the Nation 
1707-1837, London: Pimlico Books, 2003.
37. Teatro de las grandezas de la villa de Madrid, Madrid, 1623; pp. 3-5.
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was fundamentally religious and local. An interesting example is the com-
memoration in Valencia in 1638 of the reconquest of the city from the Moor, 
which, in the pages of the local chronicler and secretary of the aristocratic 
estate Marcos Antoni Ortí, appears to arouse more excitement than the vic-
tory achieved that same autumn over the French invaders at Fuenterrabía. 
Clearly the union of minds and hearts at which Olivares was aiming had still 
some way to go. The contrast with the England of the time, unified in its cel-
ebration of the providential delivery of the ‘Protestant Isle’ from its enemies, 
could hardly be more stark. The ‘bells and bonfires’, of which David Cressy 
writes, kept seventeenth-century Englishmen aware of their collective identity 
in a way which it would be difficult to match in Spain. Even the figure of the 
Cid or of Saint James the ‘Moor slayer’ were not truly ‘national’, since they 
had only an indirect resonance in a Catalonia or Valencia which looked to 
Saint George. Nor even in Castile can it be said they were really ‘popular’ fig-
ures compared with local saints and heroes.
Undoubtedly there was less integration of the different regions of Spain 
at the economic level than would be the case, say, with their English equiva-
lents. The words of the Count of Gondomar from his embassy in London, 
condemning the poor state of the Spanish inns and the general difficulty of 
travel in the Peninsula are perhaps eloquent enough testimony of a situation 
which still captured the attention of travellers in the Romantic period. But in 
addition to all this there was the fundamental culture of a Catholic people 
who were reluctant to accept the modern concept of an omnipotent and inva-
sive ‘state’. Stressing the need for flexibility of government, which must be 
adjusted to the character and needs of the local community, the statesman 
and bishop Juan de Palafox y Mendoza wrote in 1665: 
Only God can create kingdoms, each with its own temperament, one different 
from another; so the laws and forms of government must vary too. In all of Biscay 
you will hardly find an orange, nor a chestnut in Valencia; yet Valencia has any 
number of oranges, Biscay all the chestnuts you want. This was God’s will, that 
one country should depend thus on another so that mankind would become more 
sociable38.
If the oranges and chestnuts were an expression of the divine will, the 
question of peaceful exchange was eventually to prove as elusive as the 
plans of Olivares for a union of hearts and minds. Was it not ultimately the 
problem of adjusting regional goals one to another which was to become the 
critical factor in the on-going development of a Spanish state and beyond that 
of Spain as a nation?
38. Quoted in SIMON i TARRÉS, Antoni. Construccions polítiques; p. 291.
